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 
Abstract—The issue of increasing volume, variety and velocity 
of has been an area of concern in cloud forensics. The high 
volume of data will, at some point, become computationally 
exhaustive to be fully extracted and analysed in a timely manner. 
To cut down the size of investigation, it is important for a digital 
forensic practitioner to possess a well-rounded knowledge about 
the most relevant data artefacts from the cloud product 
investigating. In this paper, we seek to tackle on the residual 
artefacts from the use of CloudMe cloud storage service. We 
demonstrate the types and locations of the artefacts relating to 
the installation, uninstallation, log-in, log-off, and file 
synchronisation activities from the computer desktop and mobile 
clients. Findings from this research will pave the way towards the 
development of data mining methods for cloud-enabled big data 
endpoint forensics investigation.  
 
Index Terms— Big data forensics, cloud forensics, CloudMe 
forensics, mobile forensics  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ith the advancement of broadband and pervasive media 
devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets), it is not 
uncommon to find consumer devices storage media that 
can hold up to Terabytes (TB) worth of data. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s fifteen Regional Computer Forensic 
Laboratories reported that the average amount of data they 
processed in 2014 is 22.10 times the amount of data ten years 
back, up from 22TB to 5060TB [1], [2]. The increase in 
storage capacity had a direct impact on cloud forensic, and 
hence it is inevitable that big data solutions become an integral 
part of cloud forensics tools [3]. 
Due to the nature of cloud-enabled big data storage 
solutions, identification of the artefacts from the cloud hosting 
environment may be a ‘finding a needle in a haystack’ 
exercise [4]. The data could be segregated across multiple 
servers via virtualisation [5]. Lack of physical access to the 
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cloud hosting environment means the examiners may need to 
rely on the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) for preservation of 
evidence at a lower level of abstraction, and this may not often 
be viable due to service level agreements between a CSP and 
its consumers [6]–[14]. Even if the location of the data could 
be identified, traditional practices and approaches to computer 
forensics investigation are unlikely to be adequate [9] i.e., the 
existing digital forensic practices generally require a bit-by-bit 
copy of an entire storage media [15]–[17] which is unrealistic 
and perhaps computationally infeasible on a large-scale 
dataset [12]. It has been demonstrated that it could take more 
than 9 hours to merely acquire 30GB of data from an 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud environment [18], [19] 
hence, the time required to acquire a significantly larger 
dataset could be considerably longer. These challenges are 
compounded in cross-jurisdictional investigations which could 
prohibit the transfer of evidential data due to the lack of cross-
nation legislative agreements in place [7], [20]–[22]. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that forensic analysis of the cloud 
service endpoints remains an area of research interest [22]–
[29]. 
CloudMe (previously known as ‘iCloud’) is a Software as a 
Service (SaaS) cloud model currently owned and operated by 
Xcerion [30]. The CloudMe service is provided in a free 
version up to 19 GB (with referral program) and premium 
versions up to 500 GB storage for consumers and 5 TB for 
business users [31]. CloudMe users may share contents with 
each other as well as public users through email, text-
messaging, Facebook and Google sharing. There are three (3) 
modes of sharing in CloudMe namely WebShare, WebShare+, 
and Collaborate. WebShare only permits one-way sharing 
where the recipients are not allowed to make changes to the 
shared folder. WebShare+ allows users to upload files/folders 
only, while collaborative sharing allows the recipients to add, 
edit or delete the content, even without the use of CloudMe 
client application [32]. The service can be accessed using the 
web User Interface (UI) as an Internet file system or the client 
applications, which are available for Microsoft Windows, 
Linux, Mac OSX, Android, iOS, Google TV, Samsung Smart 
TV, Western Digital TV, Windows Storage Servers, Novell’s 
Dynamic File Services Suite, Novosoft Handy Backup etc. 
CloudMe is also compatible with third (3
rd
) path software and 
Internet services, enabling file compression, encryption, 
document viewing, video and music streaming etc. through the 
web/client applications [32]. 
In this paper, we seek to identify, collect, preserve, and 
analyse residual artefacts of use CloudMe cloud storage 
service on a range of end-point devices. We focus on the 
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residual artefacts from the client-side perspective to provide 
core-evidences serve as starting points for CloudMe 
investigation in a big data environment. We attempt to answer 
the following questions in this research:  
1. What residual artefacts remain on the hard drive and 
physical memory after a user has used the CloudMe 
desktop client applications, and the locations of the 
data remnants on a Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OS 
client device? 
2. What residual artefacts can be recovered from the 
hard drive and physical memory after a user has used 
the CloudMe web application? 
3. What Cloudme residual artefacts remain on the 
internal memory, and the locations of the data 
remnants on an Android and iOS client device? 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, 
we describe the related work.  Section  III highlights the 
experiment environment setup. In Section  IV, we discuss the 
traces from the storage media and physical memory dumps of 
the desktop clients. Section  V presents the findings from 
mobile clients and network traffic, respectively. Finally, we 
conclude the paper and outline potential future research areas 
in Section  VI.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) 
defines cloud computing as “[a] model for enabling 
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, 
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management 
effort or service provider interaction” [33]. The key aspects 
are to provide on-demand self-service, broad network access, 
resource pooling, rapid edacity, and measured services. There 
are three cloud computing service models [33], which are 
Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), 
and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). NIST [33] also defined 
four deployment models as part of the cloud computing 
definition, which are public, private, community, and hybrid 
clouds. The public cloud is owned and operated by a provider 
organisation. Consumers can subscribe to the service for a fee, 
based on the storage or bandwidth usage. On the other hand, 
the private cloud is tailored to a single organisation’s needs. 
The cloud infrastructure that is administered by organisations 
sharing common concerns (e.g., mission, security 
requirements, policy, and compliance considerations) are 
called community cloud.  
Cloud computing is not without its own unique forensics 
challenges. Challenges such as jurisdiction differences, loss of 
data control, physical inaccessibility of evidences, multi-
tenancy, and lack of tools for large scale distributed and 
virtualized systems are often cited as main causes of concern 
for cloud forensics [34]–[37]. Other pinpointed challenges 
include diverse digital media types, anonymity of IP 
addresses, decentralisation, and utilisation of anti-forensic and 
encryption techniques [36], [38], [39]. Fahdi et al. [40] found 
that the top three cloud forensic challenges according to digital 
forensic practitioners are volume of data, legal aspect, and 
time, while the top three challenges raised by digital forensic 
researchers are time, volume of data, and automation of 
forensic analysis.  
Delving deeper into the legal challenges, Hooper et al.[20] 
reviewed the 2011 Australian Federal Government’s 
Cybercrime Bill amendment on mutual legal assistance 
requests and concluded that laws amendment on a jurisdiction 
alone may not be adequate to address multi-jurisdiction 
investigation issues in cloud computing environments. Martini 
and Choo[7], Taylor et at. [41], and Daryabar et al.[10] also 
agree on the need for harmonious laws across jurisdictions. 
Simou et al. [36] and Pichan et al. [37] added that the issues of 
CSP dependence could exacerbate the challenges in all stages 
of cloud forensics (e.g., identify, preserve, analyse, and report 
[42], [43]). Consequently, Farina et al. [44] and Damshenas et 
al.[3], [11] suggested that such concerns can be mitigated 
through clearly-defined Service Level Agreements (SLA) 
between service providers and consumers. 
Martini and Choo [45] proposed the first cloud forensic 
investigation framework, which was derived based upon the 
frameworks of McKemmish [46] and NIST [43]. The 
framework was used to investigate ownCloud[47], Amazon 
EC2[18], VMWare [48], and XtreemFS [49]. Quick et al.[22] 
further extended and validated the four-stage framework using 
SkyDrive, Dropbox, Google Drive, and ownCloud. Chung et 
al. [50] proposed a methodology for cloud investigation on 
Windows, Mac OSX, iOS, and Android devices. The 
methodology was then used to investigate Amazon S3, Google 
Docs, and Evernote. Scanlon et al. [51] outlined a 
methodology for remote acquisition of evidences from 
decentralised file synchronisation networks and utilised it to 
investigate BitTorrent Sync [52]. In another study, Teing et al. 
[53] proposed a methodology for investigating the newer 
BitTorrent Sync application (version 2.0) or any third party or 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) applications. Do et 
al. [54] proposed an adversary model for digital forensics and 
demonstrated how such an adversary model can be used to 
investigate mobile devices (e.g. Android smartwatch –  Do et 
al. [55] and apps). Ab Rahman et al. [56], proposed a 
conceptual forensic-by-design framework to integrate 
forensics tools and best practices in development of cloud 
systems.  
Marty [57] and Shields et al. [58] proposed a proactive 
application-level logging mechanism, designed to log 
information of forensics interest. However, Zawoad and 
Hasan[59] argued that the proposed solutions may not be 
viable in real world scenarios. Forensic researchers such as 
Dykstra and Sherman [60], Gebhardt
 
and Reiser [61], Quick et 
al. [22], and Martini and Choo [48], on the other hand, 
presented methods and prototype implementations to support 
the (remote) collection of evidential materials using 
Application Programming Interfaces (API). Quick and 
Choo[62] and Teing et al.[25] studied the integrity of data 
downloaded from the web and desktop clients of Dropbox, 
Google Drive, Skydrive, and Symform and identified that the 
act of downloading files from client applications does not 
breach the evidence integrity (e.g., no change in the hash 
values), despite changes in file creation/modification time.  
In addition to remote collection of evidences, scholars also 
studied the potential of on-device collection of cloud artefacts 
such as from Evernote[50], Amazon S3[50], Dropbox [29], 
 3 
[50], Google Drive [27], [50], Microsoft Skydrive [28], 
Amazon Cloud Drive[63], BitTorrent Sync[64], 
SugarSync[65], Ubuntu One[26], huBic[66], Mega[67], 
Syncany [24] as well as different mobile cloud apps [15], [68], 
[69]. Quick and Choo [27]–[29] also identified that data 
erasing tools such as Eraser and CCleaner could not 
completely remove the data remnants from Dropbox, Google 
Drive, and Microsoft SkyDrive.  From the literature, there is 
currently no work that focuses on forensic investigation of 
CloudMe SaaS cloud – a gap we aim to cover in this research.  
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We adopted the research methodology of Quick and Choo 
[27]–[29] and Teing et al. [25], [53], [70] in the design of our 
experiments. The first step of the experiment was to setup the 
test environments for the desktop and mobile clients. The 
former consisted of three Virtual Machines (VMs) with 
following configurations: 
 Windows 8.1 Professional (Service Pack 1, 64-bit, 
build 9600) with 2GB RAM and 20GB hard drive. 
 Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS with 1GB RAM and 20GB hard 
disk. 
 Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5 with 1GB RAM and 
60GB hard drive.  
The VMs were hosted using VMware Fusion Professional 
version 7.0.0 (2103067) on a Macbook Pro running Mac OS X 
Mavericks 10.9.5, with a 2.6GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 
16GB of RAM. As explained by Quick and Choo [27]–[29], 
using physical hardware to undertake setup, erasing, copying, 
and re-installing an application would have been an onerous 
exercise. The client mobile devices comprised a factory 
restored iPhone 4 running iOS 7.1.2 and an HTC One X 
running Android KitKat 4.4.4. The mobile devices were 
jailbroken/rooted with ‘Pangu8 Version 1.1’ and ‘Odin3 
Version 185’ (respectively) to enable root 
access. The 3111
th
 email messages of the Berkeley Enron emai
l 
 dataset (downloaded from http://bailando.sims.berkeley.edu/e
nron_email.html) were used to create a set of sample files 
which are saved in .RTF, .TXT, .DOCX, .JPG (print screen), 
.ZIP, and .PDF formats, providing dataset for this research 
experiment. Similar to previous studies [25], [28], [65], [71], 
we conducted a predefined set of experiments namely 
installation and uninstallation of the CloudMe client 
applications as well as uploading, downloading, viewing, 
deleting, unsyncing, sharing, and inactivating the sync 
files/folders to simulate various real world scenarios of using 
the CloudMe desktop and mobile client applications as well as 
web application using the Google Chrome client for Windows 
version 51.0.2704.103m. Before each experiment, we made a 
base snapshot of each VM workstation to serve as a control 
case. After each experiment, we created a snapshot of the VM 
workstations and took a bit-stream (dd) image of the virtual 
memory (.VMEM file) and a forensic copy of the virtual disk 
(.VMDK file) of the latter in Encase Evidence (E01) format. 
The decision to instantiate the physical memory dumps and 
hard disks with the virtual disk and memory files was taken to 
prevent the datasets from being modified because of using 
memory/image acquisition tools [27]–[29]. As for the mobile 
clients, we made binary images using ’dd’ over SSH/ADB 
Shell. 
In addition, we set up a forensic workstation with the tools 
in Table I to analyse collected evidences. We filtered collected 
data that matched the terms ‘cloudme’, ‘xcerion, and 
‘Enron3111′ in the forensic images. These included SQLite 
database files, PLIST files, prefetch files, event logs, 
shortcuts, thumbnail cache, $MFT, $LogFile, $UsnJrnl, as 
well as web browser files (e.g., in 
%AppData%\Local\Google, %AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Wi
ndows\WebCache, %AppData%\Roaming\Mozilla, %AppData
%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Files\index.dat). 
Memory images were analysed using Volatility, Photorec file 
carver, and HxD Hex Editor. For all the data collected, both 
MD5 and SHA1 hash values were calculated and subsequently 
verified. All experiments were repeated thrice (at different 
dates) to ensure consistency of findings.  
IV. CLOUDME ANALYSIS ON DESKTOP CLIENTS 
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The installation of the CloudMe desktop clients created the 
data directory at %AppData%\Local\CloudMe, /home/<User 
Profile>/.local/share/CloudMe,  /Users/<User 
Profile>/Library/Application Support/CloudMe on the 
Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OS desktop clients. The sync 
(download) folders were located in the OS’ Documents 
directory, such as %Users%\[User Profile]\Documents, 
/home/[User Profile]/Documents, /User/[User 
Profile]/Documents/ on the Windows, Ubuntu and Mac OS 
clients by default. Deleting the sync folders with the option 
"When delete folder in the cloud and all its content is 
selected." in the client applications, we observed that the sync 
folders remained locally but were removed completely from 
the server. In all scenarios, the data and download directories 
remained after the uninstallation of the client applications. 
A. Cache.db Database 
The file synchronisation metadata and cloud transaction 
records could be predominantly located in the 
/%CloudMe%/cache.db database (in the data directory). The 
tables of forensic interest are ‘user_table’, ‘syncfolder_table’, 
‘syncfolder_folder_table’, and ‘syncfolder_document_table’. 
The ‘user_table’ holds the property information of users which 
logged in from the desktop clients; ‘syncfolder_table’ 
maintains a list of metadata associated with the sync folder(s) 
added by or download to the local device; 
‘syncfolder_folder_table’ keeps track of the tree structure for 
the sync folder(s); ‘syncfolder_document_table’ records the 
metadata associated with the synced files in the sync folder(s). 
Details of the table columns of forensic interest are presented 
in Table II. 
 
Fig. 2. The SQL query used to parse the synchronisation history from 
Cache.db. 
 
Fig. 1. An excerpt of the output of the SQLite query from the Cache.db database. 
  
TABLE I 
TOOLS PREPARED FOR SYNCANY FORENSICS 
Tools Usage 
FTK Imager Version 3.2.0.0 To create a forensic image of the .VMDK files. 
dd version 1.3.4-1 To produce a bit-for-bit image of the .VMEM files. 
Autopsy 3.1.1 To parse the file system, produce directory listings, as well as extracting/analysing the files, Windows 
registry, swap file/partition, and unallocated space of the forensic images. 
HxD Version 1.7.7.0 To conduct keyword searches in the unstructured datasets. 
Volatility 2.4 To extract the running processes and network information from the physical memory dumps, dumping 
files from the memory space of the Syncany client applications, and detecting the memory space of a 
string (using the ‘pslist’, ‘netstat’/’netscan’, ‘memdump’ and ‘yarascan’ functions). 
SQLite Browser Version 3.4.0 and 
SQLite Forensic Explorer version  
To view the contents of SQLite database files. 
Photorec 7.0 To data carve the unstructured datasets. 
File juicer 4.45 To extract files from files. 
BrowsingHistoryView v.1.60 To analyse the web browsing history. 
Nirsoft Web Browser Passview v1.58 To recover the credential details stored in web browsers. 
Nirsoft cache viewer, 
ChromeCacheView 1.56, 
MozillaCacheView 1.62, IECacheView 
1.53 
To analyse the web browsing caches. 
Thumbcacheviewer Version 1.0.2.7 To examine the Windows thumbnail cache. 
Windows Event Viewer Version 1.0 To view the Windows event logs. 
Console Version 10.10 (543) To view log files. 
Windows File Analyser 2.6.0.0 To analyse the Windows prefetch and link files. 
NTFS Log Tracker To parse and analyse the $LogFile, $MFT, and $UsnJrnl New Technology File System (NTFS) files. 
Plist Explorer v1.0 To examine the contents of Apple Property List (PLIST) files. 
 
 
 
 5 
Fig. 1.  shows the SQL query used to parse Cache.db and 
produce synchronization history shown in Fig. 2. Examination 
of the Windows registry revealed the username for the 
currently logged in user and the device name in 
HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\CloudMe\Sync\startup\me 
and HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\CloudMe\Sync\<Userna
me>\_xClientId (respectively). The username can be a useful 
identifying information for the cache.db database’s remnants 
i.e., locating copies of the ‘user_table’ data in physical 
memory dumps. The client ID is a unique 32-character 
alphanumeric string used to identify a CloudMe device, which 
can be used to correlate residual evidences. 
In Ubuntu client both username and clientID were detected 
at /home/<User Profile>/.config/CloudMe/Sync.conf file, by 
looking at values for entries ‘me’ (of the ‘startup’ property) 
and ‘_xClientId’ (of the 'Username' property) respectively. In 
the Mac OSX client, Username and ClientID were detected in 
the ‘startup.me’ and ‘[Username].xClientId’ properties of the 
/Users/<User 
Profile>/Library/Preferences/com.CloudMe.Sync.plist file. 
B. Cloudme Log Files 
Log files play a vital role in an incident investigation [13]. The 
CloudMe log files are located in the ‘logs’ subdirectory and 
created daily and named as [Year-Month-Day].txt. Although 
the log file only recorded application errors,  it was possible to 
identify the file synchronisation time alongside the sync path 
from the log entries such as 
“2016-03-15 14:52:02: CloudMeUnthreaded: Request error: 
"/Users/alice/Documents/UbuntuShareFolder/UbuntuSubFold
er/UbuntuSubFolder/Enron3111.docx"  |  "Error downloading
 https://os.cloudme.com/v1/users/12886417622/favorites/1121
12/webshare/UbuntuSubFolder/UbuntuSubFolder/Enron3111.
docx - server replied: Not Found"  Error number:  203”, 
“2016-03-15 14:56:30: onSyncRequestFailed:  
"WindowsSubFolder/WindowsSubFolder/Enron3111.pdf"  | 
Type: "Uploading"  |  Error:  "7"”, “2016-03-
15 14:56:30: SYNC_FILE_NOT_FOUND—
SYNC_FOLDER_NOT_FOUND: ( 0 )  "WindowsSubFolder/
WindowsSubFolder/Enron3111.pdf" :” and “2016-03-15 14:51
:52: addRemoveLocalFolder:Fail:  "/home/suspectpc/UbuntuS
yncFolder/UbuntuSubFolder"”. We could also recover the 
TABLE II 
TABLES AND TABLE COLUMNS OF FORENSIC INTERESTS FROM CACHE.DB 
Table Table Column Relevance 
user_table user_id A unique numerical user ID for the user(s) logged in from the local device. This ID could assist a 
practitioner in correlating any user-specific data that might have been obtained from other sources 
of evidence. 
 username Username provided by the user during registration. 
 devicename Device name provided by the user during registration. 
 created Holds the addition time of the user account(s) in datetime format. 
syncfolder_table owner Owner’s ID which correlates with the ‘user_id’ table column of the ‘user_table’ table. 
 name Folder name. 
 local_path Local directory path. 
 cloud_path Server’s directory path. 
 folder_id A unique numeric folder ID for the sync folder(s). 
 created Folder creation date in datetime format 
 last_run Last sync time in datetime format. 
 inactivated Folder has been inactivated; ‘true’ if yes, ‘false’ if no. 
 encrypted Folder has been encrypted; ‘true’ if yes, ‘false’ if no. 
Syncfolder_folder_table name Folder name which correlates with the ‘name’ table column of the ‘syncfolder_table’ table. 
 root_folder_id Folder ID for the root sync folder, which correlates with the ‘folder_id’ table column of the 
‘syncfolder_table’ table. 
 folder_id Folder ID for the sync folder(s), including the folder ID for the subfolder(s). 
 child_folder_id A unique numeric folder ID for the subfolder(s) associated with the sync folder(s). The root folder 
retains its original folder ID unchanged. 
 creation_date Folder creation time in datetime format. 
 deleted Folder has been deleted; NULL if not deleted. 
 owner Owner’s ID for the sync folder(s), which correlates with the ‘user_id’ table column of ‘ user_table’ 
table. 
syncfolder_document_table owner Owner’s ID for the sync folder(s), which correlates with the ‘user_id’ table column of ‘ user_table’ 
table. 
 name Folder name. 
 root_folder_id Folder ID for the root sync folder. 
 folder_id Folder ID for the sync folder(s), including the folder ID for the subfolder(s), which correlates with 
the ‘child_folder_id’ table column of the ‘syncfolder_folder_table’ table. 
 document_id A unique numeric document ID for the sync file(s). 
 size File size. 
 modified_date Last modified date in datetime format. 
 checksum MD5 checksum for the modified document. 
 main_checksum MD5 checksum for the original document. 
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login time alongside the logged in username from the log 
entry “2016-03-15 13:48:22: Logged in as: "adamthomson"”. 
C. Web Browser Artefacts 
Web browsing activities history is a critical source of evidence 
[25], [27]–[29], [47]. Our analysis of the web browsing history 
found unique identifying URLs associated with the user 
actions. For example, when accessing a sync folder in the 
CloudMe web application, we observed following URLs: 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#files:/Documents/<Folde
r name>, 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#files:/f:<Folder ID>, 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#sync:/f: <Folder ID>, 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#sync:/<Folder ID>, and 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en#sync:/f:<Folder ID>, 
<Folder name>.  
Accessing or downloaded a sync file produced following 
URL: 
 https://www.cloudme.com/v1/documents/<Folder 
ID>/<Document ID>/1/<Filename>. 
When we accessed the folders shared with other users, we 
observed following URL: 
 
https://www.cloudme.com/en#webshares:/<Folder 
name>. 
The download URL for the shared file could be discerned 
from: 
 https://www.cloudme.com/v1/documents/<Folder ID>
/<Document ID>/1/<Filename>?dl=<Filename>. 
The web client’s logout action generated following URL: 
 https://www.cloudme.com/en?r=1458192365602&log
out=1.  
Rebuilding the web browsing caches produced the root 
directory for the web application at www.cloudme.com/v1. In 
particular, within the /%v1%/folders directory we recovered a 
list of metadata files for the sync folders accessed by the user, 
which could be differentiated by the folder ID. Fig.  3 
illustrates the metadata information associated with the sync 
folders; each of which creates a ‘folder’ subtag to house the 
folder ID and name, and a ‘tag’ subtag to hold the folder 
sharing information such as the webshare ID and folder 
sharing type i.e., in the ‘group’ property. 
A search for the filenames of the sample files recovered 
files viewed on the web application in cache at 
 
Fig.  6. An excerpt of the folder listing metadata file. 
 
 
Fig.  5. An excerpt of the device-specific sync folder metadata file. 
 
 
Fig.  4. The content of the extended=true&order=favoritename&count=1000&offset=0&_=1458191.xml document. 
 
 
Fig.  3. The content of the order=name&desc=false&count=1000&offset=0&resources=true&_=145.xml document. 
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/%v1%/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID>/1/. We also 
recovered thumbnails for the viewed files in 
/%v1%/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID>/<Thumbnai
l ID>. Notice that the /%v1%/documents directory will always 
contain at least one folder i.e., holding the metadata files 
associated with the sync devices at 
/%v1%/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID for device-
specific metadata file>\1. Fig.  4 shows that the device name 
and client ID can be detected from the ‘dName’ and ‘clientId’ 
properties of the ‘sync’ tag in the metadata file. Each sync 
folder creates a ‘syncfolder’ subtag to define the folder name, 
directory path, folder ID, last sync time, and information about 
whether the sync folder has been synchronised and if it is a 
favourite folder in the ‘name’, path’, ‘folderId,’ lastSync’, 
‘hasSynchronized’, and ‘favoriteFolder’ properties 
respectively. 
 Another directory of interest within the ‘v1’ directory is the 
user-specific %v1%\users\<User ID> directory, which 
maintains a list of OpenSearch [72] description documents 
containing a wealth of folder metadata of forensic interest 
about the sync folders 
[73]. For example, the %v1%/users/<User ID>/favorites/exte
nded=true&order=favoritename&count=1000&offset=0&_=
1458191.xml document holds the OpenSearch description for 
the favourite folders. The metadata of interest recovered from 
this document include the folder IDs, folder names, folder 
sharing passwords, webshare IDs, as well as usernames and 
user IDs for the favourite folders in the ‘folder_id’, ‘name’, 
‘password’, ‘webShareId’, sharingUserId’, 
‘sharingUserName’ properties of the sync folder/file-specific 
‘favorite’ subtags (see Fig.  5). The 
%v1%/users/<User ID>/webshares/order=name&desc=false
&count=1000&offset=0&resources=true&_=145.xml docum
ent defines the OpenSearch property of the shared 
folders/files, such as the update time, creation time, 
passwords, creators’ IDs, webshare IDs in the ‘updated’, 
created’, ‘password’, ‘userId’, and ‘id’ properties of the sync 
folder/file-specific ‘webshare’ subtags. The folder name and 
ID could be discerned from the ‘name’ and ‘id’ properties of 
the ‘folder’ subtag (see Fig.  6). Further details of the 
folder/file sharing could be located in the 
%v1%/users/<User ID>/lifestream document, such as the 
senders’ user ID, senders’ group ID, senders’ username, 
receivers’ user ID, receivers’ group ID, receiver’s username, 
favourite IDs (for favourite folders), and whether the sharing 
has been seen in the ‘senderId’, ‘senderGroupId’, 
‘senderName’, ‘receiverId’, ‘receiverGroupId’, 
‘receiverName’, ‘parentFolder’, and ‘seen’ properties in the 
‘event’ subtags. 
D. Physical Memory Analysis 
For all investigated client applications, analysis of the physical 
memory dumps using the ‘pslist’ function of Volatility 
recovered the process name, process identifier (PID), parent 
process identifiers (PPID) as well as process initiation time. 
We determined that the CloudMe process could be 
differentiated using the process names ‘CloudMe.exe’, 
‘cloudme-sync’ and ‘CloudMe’ on the Windows, Ubuntu and 
Mac OS clients respectively.  
Undertaking data carving of the memory image of the 
CloudMe process determined that the files of forensic interest 
such as cache.db, sync.config, and CloudMe logs can be 
recovered. When CloudMe was accessed using the web client, 
we could recover copies of the OpenSearch description 
documents containing the folder sharing passwords from the 
web browser’s memory space intact. Unsurprisingly, we also 
managed to recover copies of the database, configuration, and 
log files in plain text. For the cache database, a search for the 
username for the user could locate the data [74] of the 
‘user_table’, which holds the user ID in the row ID variant 
field of the cell header section [74] in hex format.  Once the 
user ID is identified, a practitioner may locate the file offsets 
contained between the cell data section of the 
‘syncfolder_document_table’, ‘syncfolder_folder_table’ and 
‘syncfolder_table’ tables, and work backwards to read the 
header field type variants [74] to recover the remaining data 
fields. 
V. CLOUDME ANALYSIS ON MOBILE CLIENTS 
Our examinations of the CloudMe mobile clients determined 
that the data directory is located in 
/private/var/mobile/Applications/<Universally Unique 
Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS app>/ and 
/data/data/com.excerion.android on the iOS and Android 
clients. Although the mobile clients did not keep a copy of the 
sync folders from the user’s account (like as the desktop 
clients), it was possible to recover copies of the viewed files 
from %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the 
CloudMe iOS app>%/Documents/persistentCache/ and 
/storage/sdcard0/Android/data/com.xcerion.android/cache/file
s/Downloads/ of the iOS and Android clients by default.  
A. com.xcerion.icloud.iphone.plist and user_data.xml Files 
A closer examination of the files in the directory listings 
located the username and password in plaintext in the 
‘username’ and ‘password’ properties of the %<Universally 
Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe 
iOS app>%/Library/Preferences/com.xcerion.icloud.iphone.pl
ist and %com.excerion.android%/shared_prefs/user_data.xml 
files. The former also held the last upload time in datetime 
format in the ‘<username_LastUploadTime>’ property. 
B. db.sdb Database 
Analysis of the Android client revealed the cache database at 
/storage/sdcard0/Android/data/com.xcerion.android/cache/db.
sdb. The tables of interest with the cache database are ‘files’ 
and ‘folders’. The ‘files’ table maintains a list of metadata of 
the sync files viewed by the user, while the ‘folders’ table 
holds the metadata of the sync folders associated with the 
user’s account. db.sdb Database shows the table fields of 
interest from the db.sdb database. We also proposed a SQL 
query to thread the table fields of interest from the tables to 
present the records in a forensically-friendly format as shown 
in Fig.  7. 
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C. Cache.db Database 
Further examination of the iOS client recovered copies of the 
responses for the web API 
queries in the %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for th
e CloudMe iOS app>%/Library/Caches/com.xcerion.icloud.ip
hone/nsurlcache/Cache.db database. Specifically, we located 
the cached items in the ‘receiver_data’ table column of the 
cfurl_cache_receiver_data table in Binary Large OBject 
(BLOB) including metadata files and OpenSearch documents 
for the sync folders. Within the cfurl_cache_response table we 
located the corresponding URLs and timestamps in datetime 
format, in the “request_key” and “time_stamp” table columns,
 respectively.  By threading the data fields using the SQL quer
y “SELECT cfurl_cache_receiver_data.receiver_data, cfurl_c
ache_response.request_key, cfurl_cache_response.time_stamp
 FROM cfurl_cache_receiver_data, cfurl_cache_response WH
ERE cfurl_cache_receiver_data.entry_ID=cfurl_cache_respo
nse.entry_ID”, it was possible to correlate the cached items 
with the URLs and timestamps.  
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we examined the client residual artefacts left by 
CloudMe SaaS cloud as a backbone for big data storage. Our 
research included installing the client applications as well as 
uploading, downloading, deleting, sharing and 
activating/inactivating the sync folders/files using the client 
and web applications. We determined that a forensic 
practitioner investigating CloudMe cloud application should 
pay attention to the cache database, web caches, as well as log 
and configuration files as highlighted in TABLE IV. Unlike 
cloud applications such as Symform [25] and BitTorrent Sync 
[23],  the CloudMe client applications did not create any 
identifying information (e.g., configuration file and cache 
folder) in the sync folders, and hence a practitioner cannot 
identify the sync directories from the directory listing. This 
also indicates that the cache database is critical source of 
evidence for the synchronisation metadata and cloud 
transaction records, and hence should not be overlooked. 
TABLE III 
TABLE FIELDS OF FORENSIC INTEREST FROM THE DB.SDB DATABASE. 
Table Table column Relevance 
files _id A unique numerical user ID used to identify a CloudMe sync file. 
 name Filename for the sync file. 
 folder_id Folder ID for the folder housing the sync file. 
 size File size for the sync file. 
 href URL to the sync file. 
 published Sync file addition time in datetime format. 
 updated Last updated time of sync file in datetime format. 
 owner Owner’s name of the sync file. 
 Mime Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) format of the sync file. 
folders Owner Owner’s name of the sync folder. 
 Folder_id A unique numerical user ID used to identify a CloudMe sync folder. 
 Name Folder’s name. 
 Parent Folder’s name for the parent folder. 
 Is_root Whether the sync folder is a root folder? 
 Path Original directory path for the sync folder.  
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 Analysis of the mobile clients determined that the findings 
were not as conclusive in comparison with the desktop clients, 
and only the viewed files could be recovered. This indicated 
that the iOS and Android mobile clients are merely a UI for 
the web application. Our examination of the web browsing 
activities identified unique URLs that can aid in identification 
of the user actions made to the web application, such as login, 
logout, and accessing and downloading sync files/folders. 
Although the application layer was fully encrypted i.e., with 
the deployment of HTTPS, we were able to recover the root 
directory for the web application from the web browser’s 
caches unencrypted, which included viewed files and metadata 
files and OpenSearch documents for the sync files/folders that 
contain the timestamp information and sharing passwords for 
the sync folders/files. However, a practitioner should note that 
the availability of the cached items depends on the API 
requests made to the web application and hence the artefacts 
may not be consistent across different occasions.  
Our analysis of the physical memory captures revealed that 
the memory dumps may provide potential for alternative 
methods for recovering applications cache, logs, configuration 
files and other files of forensic interest. It was also possible to 
recover the folder sharing password from the web cache in 
plain text, but not for the login password. This suggested that a 
practitioner can only obtain the login password from the 
mobile clients, using WebBrowserPassView when manually 
saved in the web browsers, through an offline brute-force 
technique, or directly from the user. Nevertheless, a 
practitioner must keep in mind that memory changes 
frequently according to user activities and will be wiped as 
soon as the system is shut down. Hence, obtaining the memory 
snapshot of a compromised system as quickly as possible 
increases the likelihood of obtaining the encryption key before 
it is overwritten in memory. 
 Future work would include extending this study to cloud 
storage services to have an up-to-date understanding of the big 
data artefacts from different cloud deployment models, which 
could lay the foundation for the development of data reduction 
techniques (e.g., data mining and intelligence analysis) for 
these technologies [2], [4], [75], [76]. 
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